

# THE NEW WORLD ORDER: Central America and The Middle East

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**A Special Lecture by Professor Noam Chomsky  
At George Washington University**

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...I'll start believing in the miracles of Japanese technology when they figure out a way to televise without roasting the person who's standing up in front.

The announced topic was "The New World Order: Central America and the Middle East" which touches quite a few bases. And a title like that leaves essentially two options. One option is to speak in general terms about "the new world order" which, as far as I'm aware, is the old world order adapted to changing contingencies, as happens all the time. The most important of these changing contingencies having been about twenty years ago when the post-war national economic system was essentially torn apart and has been reconstructed.

A second option would be to pick some crucial issues -- some particular topics -- and to use them to illustrate the way the general contours of the "new world order" (and that means the old world order). And in thinking about it, it seemed to me that the second tack might be more informative and, in fact, almost any current issue could be used because they all illustrate the same essential features of policy. And, given U.S. power, U.S. policy has an overriding, and often determinative influence. Furthermore, they all illustrate the same aspects of the ideological cover within which policy is presented to us, some examples of which you just heard from our illustrious leader.

The two examples that are listed in the announcement, Central America and the Middle East, are perfectly natural ones. Both regions -- Latin America and the Middle East -- are covered by what has been the long-standing central doctrine of U.S. policy, the Monroe Doctrine, which says, in effect, that certain regions of the world are U.S. turf. No one else raises their head. No No foreign entry, certainly; but crucially, no indigenous groups. If they do, their heads are cut off if they get out of control, as the doves like to put it. The Monroe Doctrine was, of course, devised for the Western Hemisphere in less ambitious days. It's meaning for the Western Hemisphere was recently clarified in the Gates hearings. Maybe the only interesting thing that happened in the Gates hearings, as far as I noticed, was a memorandum that was released from December, 1984 in which Gates (it was addressed from Gates to William Casey, the head of the CIA) ... on U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. And it opened by saying that we have to start talking tough about Nicaragua. Let's stop the pretenses about preventing arms [shipments] to El Salvador, and all of this other nonsense which is so easily exposed. (although, I should say that the media continued to trot it out when it was useful) ... and let's start talking tough; and then he said we have to rid the hemisphere of this regime by any means necessary -- any means that we could use up to bombing. And he pointed out correctly that if we don't accept this commitment to rid the hemisphere of anybody we don't like, we will have abandoned the Monroe Doctrine which confers upon us that right.

Well, it was interesting. Actually, the day that appeared I happened to be talking to someone in Detroit, and I suggested to the audience that they keep their eyes open to see what the reaction will be to this memorandum predicting that there would be a null reaction. And, in fact, that's true. It never came up in Congress. The media didn't mention it. It wasn't considered one of the big issues. And that's exactly correct because essentially, everyone agrees. Across the spectrum, it's agreed that we have the right to rid the hemisphere -- or, for that matter, the world -- of anybody we don't like, by any means that we find feasible and possible. And he is quite right in saying that is the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine.

In this particular sense (meaning, we have the right to rid any area of anyone we don't like) the Monroe Doctrine was extended to large parts of the world after the Second World War. That's just a reflection of the extraordinary power of the U.S., at the time. In particular, it was extended to the Middle East which was described by the State Department, right after the Second World War, as the most important area in the world in the field of foreign investment. As General Eisenhower described it: "The strategically most important area in the world because of its enormous energy reserves," which have two crucial features. First



of all, whoever has influence and control over them has a considerable amount of leverage in world affairs. And secondly, there's a huge flow of capital that comes from the profits of oil production in the cheapest and most abundant areas. And that has to flow back to prop up both the corporations and the general economy of the United States and the country that in internal discussion is called "our lieutenant"; namely, Britain. The fashionable word is "partner", as Mike Mansfield put it in the Kennedy years. So we have to prop up the economy of "our lieutenant" and, of course, ourselves, more crucially.

And control of the energy resources and the profits that flow from them is a major factor. And, in fact, that's discussed in internal declassified top secret planning documents. But it's also very evident in policy. And we saw examples of that a few months ago. So, in other words, Latin America and the Middle East -- these are the obvious areas to discuss if you want to consider the core of U.S. foreign policy interests. Both areas reveal to us quite a lot about ourselves. The reason is because of our overwhelming influence in Latin America for over a century, and in the Middle East for half a century. And what we find there can tell us a good deal about who we are -- a topic which should be of interest to any honest person.

Well, discussion of Latin America could open, for example, with a Latin American strategy development workshop. In Washington -- the Pentagon -- just a year ago, which involved noted academic specialists and others ... they concluded (mostly quotes) that current relations with Mexico (the Mexican dictatorship -- that means it's a rather brutal dictatorship with a democratic cover) ... current relations with the Mexican dictatorship they said are extraordinarily positive. That means that they are untroubled by such trivialities as stolen elections, death squads, endemic torture, scandalous treatment of workers and peasants, ecological destruction in the interests of private power, and so on. But, they said that everything is not rosy. There are some problems on the horizon. And the only problem they note is (I'll quote) a democracy opening up in Mexico could test the special relationship by bringing into office a government more interested in challenging the United States on economic and nationalist grounds. But right now, everything is fine because it's just a brutal and murderous dictatorship, but if there's a democracy opening, we may have some problems, because a democracy opening might mean that various popular interests might be reflected, and that would be harmful to the U.S. concern, which is, of course, investment opportunities and the local wealthy classes, and so on.

Well, that hits the nail on the head. The primary concern of the United States in the Third World has, in fact, always been the problem of meaningful democracy which is, in fact, a threat to power and privilege. And that has to be crushed. It has to be crushed abroad, and it has to be crushed at home. And without understanding that, you understand very little about domestic or foreign affairs, or about American society and culture.

Now, of course, the methods for crushing democratic forces at home and abroad are different. Abroad, you can do it pretty much in the way that it's done by totalitarian states. They use violence. In fact, unrestricted violence. At home, over centuries of popular struggle, the capacity of the state to coerce and control has been limited, so a whole variety of other devices have been needed. But it's been well understood -- and it's a major theme of intellectual discourse, if you like, for centuries -- that methods have to be found to control and divert what they call "the rascal multitude" and to keep them from interfering in what is none of their business; namely the management of public affairs. As Walter Lippmann put it: "The elements that rule have to be protected from meddling and ignorant outsiders -- that is, the mass of the population. And if you can't do it by force, you do it by other means.

Well, a few weeks after this report on the extraordinarily positive relations with the Mexican tyranny, a leading journal in Mexico published an article reporting on a conference in Mexico -- a conference on international traffic of children, minors -- the report quotes a leading researcher at the National University, the autonomous university in Mexico, from the institute for law research, who writes: every year, twenty thousand Mexican children are sent illegally to the United States for organ transplants or for sexual exploitation, or for various experimental tests. The conference report also quotes a report of the United Nations saying that over a million children a year suffer from slavery, forced participation in



criminal acts, prostitution, organ transplant sales to rich countries. Well, is any of this true? The answer to that is: Nobody really knows, and more importantly, nobody cares -- at least nobody important cares. It's not the kind of thing we discuss around here. But whether it's true or not (it may be; it may not be) an interesting fact about our domains is that this is very widely believed. There are lots and lots of reports like this one from all through Latin America and other parts of the Third World domains, largely of the United States, that report such things. You can get similar reports from the London Anti-Slavery Society and others. And whether they're true or not, the fact that they're widely believed alone is a reflection of the reality of life in the areas where our influence has been overwhelming.

This became much worse during the Reagan-Bush years which was a period of an enormous catastrophe of capitalism throughout the entire world, aside from the state-capitalist industrial countries themselves which, in various ways, were able to protect themselves from it.

Latin America is a striking example. We might proceed with Latin America by quoting .... I'll just pick something that happened to arrive in the mail yesterday, a Latin American church journal which has an article from Uruguay by a Uruguayan journalist called, "The War Waged on Latin American Street Kids" (that's the English translation of it) and he describes (I'll give some quotes) the war being waged against millions of abandoned children throughout Latin America where death squads, run by the police and financed by the business sector, target and exterminate street kids who are trying to survive as beggars, thieves, prostitutes, drug runners or cheap factory workers. Some of the victims are gunned down while they are sleeping beneath bridges, on vacant lots or on doorways. Others are kidnapped, tortured or killed in remote areas. In Brazil, where U.S. influence has been decisive .... the overthrow of Brazilian democracy was described as the greatest victory for freedom in the mid-twentieth century by the Administration when it took place with no little U.S. support .... In Brazil, the bodies of young death squad victims are found in zones outside the metropolitan areas with their hands tied, showing signs of torture, riddled with bullet holes. Street girls are frequently forced to work as prostitutes. In one town, in the first six months of 1991, a thousand so-called "disposable children" were assassinated. In Guatemala City, another place where we have succeeded in imposing the kind of values we like, the majority of the five thousand street kids work as prostitutes. They are found with their ears cut off and their eyes gouged out, and so on. In Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, reports indicate that an average of three children under the age of eighteen are killed daily by these death squads financed by the business community. Almost all murders have been attributed to those death squads. Going on, the journalist points out that this is a region where a hundred and eighty-three million people live in abject poverty, so that death by violence is only one of the threats for street children. Regional statistics show that every minute, twenty-eight children die from hunger. According to UNICEF, sixty-nine million children survive by doing menial labor, robbing, running drugs, and prostitution. In Ecuador, about a hundred thousand children from age four up work ten to twelve-hour shifts in one region -- in Western-run, mostly U.S.-run corporations. Panama had a system of protection for miners, but the miners' protective tribunal buildings were bombed during the 1989 U.S. invasion, rendering work there nearly impossible. Following the invasion, the number of criminal gangs robbing stores in search of food increased. In Peru, fifty thousand of the six hundred thousand children born this year will not survive their first year. In one Brazilian state on the Bolivars border, approximately a thousand children work as slaves extracting tin. Another two thousand adolescents work as prostitutes. According to union sources, children work eighteen hours a day in water, up to their knees, and are paid a daily ration of bananas and boiled yucca, according to the labor union reports. Going on (I won't go on reading it), the journalist ends up saying: "Until recently, the image of the abandoned Latin American child was of a ragged child sleeping in a doorway. Today, the image is of a body lacerated and dumped in a city slum.

Well, we may feel proud of our contributions to this picture of capitalist democracy triumphant in the "new world order", and that's what the "new world order" is all about -- an intensification of the horrors of the old world order.

Well, instead of continuing through the Latin American horror chamber, which is what it



is, I'll turn to the second area, the Middle East. There's a lot to talk about there. We could talk about a lot of our exploits in the Gulf, for example. But instead, let me talk about the topic that's on the front pages right now, and has been for the last several weeks: what's called "the Middle East peace process", in particular, the conference in Madrid. I'm not going to be continuing with Latin American atrocity stories, but talking about diplomacy -- nice clean topics that won't be so bloody. But let's have a look and see what we can learn about ourselves from that.

Well, I'm sure you all read the newspapers, and you've noticed that there is universal acclaim for the diplomatic triumph of George Bush and James Baker in Madrid. So let me just remind you of some of the boilerplate. Our heroes "exploited the historic window of opportunity opened by their victory in the Gulf to breathe life into the stalled Middle East peace process, showing remarkable courage and vision." That happens to come from Anthony Lewis who is one of the most critical commentators on U.S. Government policies anywhere in the mainstream, and it sort of goes from there over to the real accolades. The United States can, at last, try to bring about its traditional goals of "land for peace", and territorial compromise and autonomy for the Palestinians in the context of a general peace now that the rejectionists are in disarray and the Russians are no longer causing mischief, and the bad guys everywhere know that "what we say goes", as the President put it last February. That's also true in Latin America where "what we say goes" has been true for a long time, with consequences of the kind that I've already indicated. The news columns report, with considerable awe, that "the President is dreaming great dreams of peace and justice, and of course, marching forth to implement them." That's diplomatic correspondent R.W. Apple in the New York Times. James Baker is praised for his diplomatic skills and his tenacity in putting together what the Times calls "the remarkable tableau in Madrid". I should point out, to be accurate, that not everyone agrees that the U.S. has really shown itself to be an honest broker. There people who claim that Bush and Baker have gone too far in allowing their pro-Arab sympathies to influence what they do. But it's agreed that they're both well on their way to a well deserved Nobel Peace Prize.

Well, that's sort of standard, but more interesting than this kind of rather standard sort of Stalinist style rhetoric .... it's very reminiscent of the days of the genius Stalin, for those of you who remember that kind of stuff. That's kind of standard, but more interesting than that is the fact that similar perceptions, though without the Stalinoid rhetoric, are pretty widespread in substantial parts of Europe, and that's more interesting. In fact, Europe has, to a large extent, come to accept the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the Middle East -- which is new -- and has also come to accept, to a certain extent, the framework of U.S. propaganda. That's also an interesting and a noticeable shift. I think it's one worth study in itself. I think it has to do with the end of the Cold War. Maybe I can comment on that later.

But even more interesting than that is that the euphoria is reaching much further, even to towns and villages in the West Bank and Gaza where expectations are apparently running quite high. The lead article of the current issue of the Journal of Palestine studies is by an advisor to the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in Madrid, Walid Khalidi, who lauds "the personal commitment of the President of the United States," (I'm quoting) "in front of Congress and the whole world, to a just and comprehensive settlement", and he's also much impressed by "the invigoration of international institutions, and the new recognition that we can't go too far with double standards." So that's a pretty broad spectrum. In my view, this is all total illusion. I'd like to give some indication of why. Let's just start with a brief comment on the matter of our abandonment of double standards. By chance, that issue of the Journal of Palestine Studies happened to arrive at my home on the same day that the lead front-page story in the newspapers read: "U.S. ACCUSES LIBYA IN PAN AM BOMBING". That's two hundred and seventy people killed. And the subheading read: "RETALIATION WEIGHED, SAYS WHITE HOUSE." And the editorials issued stern calls for just punishment, overflowing with self-righteousness. The news reports told us that "this fiendish act of wickedness had become the horrific symbol of terrorism" -- quoting the New York Times. Again, it was not entirely uniform, so the New York Times ran an op-ed pointing out that the evidence about Libya was pretty thin, and suggesting some Government duplicity in identifying Libya. The authors accused the Government of letting



the Palestinians off the hook at a sensitive moment in the peace conference. And also, they charged that Syria and Iran had been let off the hook for similar reasons. The authors of this article, representing the dissidents, are Robert and Tamara Kupperman. Robert Kupperman is a leading proponent of what is called "low-intensity conflict", the author of manuals on how to implement it officially -- manuals in which he defines low-intensity conflict. Here's the definition; it is: "the threat or use of force to achieve political objectives without the full-scale commitment of resources." That's to be distinguished from international terrorism which is defined in U.S. Army manuals as "the threat or use of force to attain goals that are political, or religious, or ideological in nature." In short, low-intensity conflict is international terrorism, as the advocates and practitioners of it are kind enough to inform us, not only in their definition, but also in the practice. So we have a spectrum, then, ranging from those who assume that Government case against Libya is proven on the obvious grounds that it had been proclaimed, and then on the other extreme, we have skeptics who are leading proponents of international terrorism, and who think that the case hasn't quite yet been proven, and that we should go after other favored enemies, like the Palestinians. So the issue is: Should we mete out stern justice to Libya alone, and also to other official enemies -- and should we use bombing or maybe some other technique. Well, that's what's known as an independent press in a free society.

Now, there were some things that were not discussed. At least I didn't see them discussed. For example, one thing NOT discussed was the worst air tragedy of the decade. That was the bombing of an Air India plane in 1985 which killed three hundred and twenty-nine people. There's a book by Leslie and Andrew Coburn called, "Out of Control" which discusses some of the background for this. Apparently, the two people who bombed it were trained in a paramilitary training camp in Alabama. This was supposedly a sting operation that went out of control. The fact that the U.S. had been involved in training the people who bombed it was acknowledged a couple of months later by the Attorney General, Edwin Meese, in India, who sort of promised the Indians that we would be careful to see that that doesn't happen again. But that was not a "horrific symbol of international terrorism" in that you don't have huge squads of thousands of people scouring the region to see what sensors you can discover, and so on and so forth. That one I didn't see mentioned, though it's the worse air tragedy of the decade. There was some mention of another air tragedy -- the downing of an Iranian commercial jet with two hundred and ninety people killed. That's also more than "the most horrific symbol of terrorism of the decade." That was described, for example by the Middle East correspondent of the Boston Globe, Mary Kurdias, as she put it: "The accidental downing of the Iranian passenger plane by the U.S.S. Vincennes" which was part of a naval armada that had been sent by George Bush to help out his pal, Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War. And in fact, the shooting down of this plane was a rather decisive event in ending the war on Iraqi (meaning U.S.) terms.

A question one might ask is: How can the news columns (these are news columns, remember) be so sure that it was an accidental downing? Well, of course there's an easy answer to that. The U.S. did it and, therefore, it follows that it was an accidental downing, just as U.S. international terrorism is laudable. It's low-intensity conflict; a good thing, not terrorism. However, not everyone agrees. Again, there's a spectrum of opinion. In this case, for example, one of the people who does not agree is U.S. Navy Commander David Carlson, who was the commander of the vessel right nearby the Vincennes, who wrote an article in the U.S. Naval Institute proceedings in which he describes (I'm quoting it now) how he wondered aloud in disbelief as they watched the Vincennes shoot down what was perfectly obviously a commercial airliner, a passenger jet, taking off at a commercial corridor. And his assumption is that this is out of a need to prove the viability of its high-tech missile system.

Well, the commander of the Vincennes didn't go completely unpunished. The President reacted. He granted him the Legion of Merit award, along with the officer-in-charge of shooting down the commercial airliner: (I'm quoting from the citation) "for exceptionally meritorious conduct and outstanding service, and for the calm and professional atmosphere under his command in the Gulf." The shooting down of the airliner was not mentioned in the citation, although that's the only known action of the Vincennes.



The media kept a dutiful silence about this, at least at home. In more civilized parts of the world like, for example, Malaysia, Third World journals were quite open about reporting the facts, including the Legion of Merit award, in reviews of U.S. international terrorism, which they don't understand, is only low-intensity conflict, and accidental.

Libya's response to these charges was a call for a hearing by the world court or some other international inquiry, a call that was regarded as reasonable by the Arab League, but it was, of course, dismissed here, without any discussion, as utter nonsense. That's what's known as "invigoration of international institutions," just as what I just described is what's known as "the abandonment of the double standard."

For those who are willing to consider fact, what I've just mentioned is like a crumb from a mountain of evidence that illustrates what a Salvadoran Jesuit journal recently described as "the ominous halo of hypocrisy covering U.S. statements and actions" -- "an ominous halo of hypocrisy that sickens and disgusts any honest person who suffers through the daily output of the commissar culture. That's a major element of the "new world order", just as it was an element of the old world order.

Well, let's put that aside and turn to the third feature which that lead article in the Journal of Palestine Studies finds so encouraging, along with most other opinion: "the personal commitment of the President to a just and comprehensive settlement." Let me now review at least what I think is happening.

It seems to me that three major questions arise about what's going on right now. One is: Why is it happening now? Why this big diplomatic flurry right now? Two: is there a break with traditional American policy? And three: What about the apparent conflict between the United States and Israel?

Let's start with the first: Why right now? And in fact, we might turn back to page one of the Boston Globe which has that lead story about the U.S. charges against Libya. That's the lead story, and, by accident or because they've got a subversive in the editorial board or something, there's an adjacent story next to it which discusses White House concern over polls that show that George Bush is falling rapidly because of the problems with the domestic economy. Well, could there be a correlation between those facts? Actually, there could be! The story of the past ten years -- the major story of the last ten years is the huge assault against the general public, which you're familiar with -- the huge transfer of resources from a large majority of the public, in fact, to wealthy privileged sectors; investors, and so on.

Now when a state is involved in policies of that kind, it's necessary to divert the public -- the ignorant and meddling outsiders -- somehow, so that they won't pay attention to what's going on around them. And that's true whether it's a totalitarian state or a democratic state. And there aren't a lot of ways to do this. Two of the ways are to inspire fear of terrible enemies who are about to destroy us. And that's got to be accompanied by awe for our amazing leaders who rise just in time, and save us from destruction so that we can, once again, be standing tall, as Ronald Reagan put it when he succeeded in overcoming the threat to our existence from Grenada, if you can remember that far back. In fact, this is pretty much the story of the last ten years. About every year or two there's some fantastic threat to our existence, but then, with incredible heroism, our leader somehow beats it down. And that's a natural concomitant of the social policies that are being carried out domestically. You'd find that in any state. Just as another natural concomitant is various devices to set sectors of the targeted populations -- most of the population .... set them against each other so that they hate each other, and so on, instead of having them paying attention to what's going on. This is all pretty standard.

Well, it's all particularly important right now for several reasons. For one thing, the social and economic catastrophe that resulted from the Reagan-Bush programs is getting harder and harder to put to the side. More and more people see it. And that means that efforts at diversion are needed -- and rapid and increasing ones. Secondly, it's also necessary to divert attention away from these foreign policy triumphs that have supposedly shown what great people we are, and have led to the Bush rhetoric. In fact, every one of



them has been a complete catastrophe from the point of view of any human value, at least. That's true of Grenada, and Panama, and most strikingly, recently, the Gulf.

It's not too pretty to look at the Gulf after our great triumph there, and notice a couple hundred thousand corpses, an ecological disaster, Saddam Hussein firmly in power, thanks to the support given to him by George Bush and Norman Schwarzkopf who backed his crushing of the popular rebellions -- the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions. In fact, for once I should say -- I've got to give the press credit -- the chief diplomatic correspondent of the New York Times (that's a technical term meaning "State Department spokesman in the New York Times") Thomas Friedman, had an accurate description of what happened. He said that right after the .... You know, George Bush was out fishing, and Norman Schwarzkopf was patting himself on the back .... at the time when Saddam Hussein was authorized to take care of the rascal multitude, the explanation that was given by Friedman expressing the State Department's position was that the United States was seeking to restore what he called "the best of all worlds." The best of all worlds would be a takeover by some Iraqi generals who would wield the iron fist, much as Saddam Hussein did in the period up until his one mistake in life; namely, when he stepped on U.S. toes on August 2nd, 1990 .... wield the iron fist as Saddam Hussein had done, much to the satisfaction of the U.S. allies, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and, of course, the boss in Washington. Well, that's essentially correct. It would be a little embarrassing to just restore Saddam Hussein after the fuss. But we need a clone. We've got find somebody exactly like him. And surely, we don't want to allow anything as dangerous as a democracy opening in the Middle East any more than we want a democracy opening in Latin America -- or, for that matter, in the United States. And if the way to block it is by supporting Saddam Hussein's iron fist, well you know, in the interests of what's called pragmatism, that's what we have to do. Pragmatism is a nice technical term that means doing anything you feel like doing for your own interests. And, therefore, we pursue pragmatism. And that even overcomes our high moral commitments to human rights, and so on and so forth.

So there is a need to divert attention. But still, it leaves kind of a bad taste. I mean, maybe the smart guys understand that this is the right thing to do. But the population, having been aroused to considerable hysteria over the need to destroy the Beast of Baghdad, has kind of a tough time figuring out these subtle points about why we're supporting him while he's massacring everybody in sight. So you've got to overcome that somehow.

There also are regional problems. The Arab tyrannies that lined up in the Gulf crusade -- these are what the British imperialists, in their day, called "the Arab facade" that manages the local oil system in the interests of the imperial powers. The British view was that we should veil absorption of the colonies behind constitutional fictions such as "buffer state" or "sphere of influence", and so on. But, of course, as Lord Lloyd George put it, in complimenting the British on blocking an international disarmament agreement, he said: "We have to reserve the right to bomb the niggers." That's sort of the bottom line. So you "reserve the right to bomb the niggers", but you've got to have this "Arab facade" out there, that you can sort of pretend they're countries, but they're actually managing the local wealth for you. And those guys have problem too. Any tyranny too has to preserve a certain degree of credibility with their population. And if they are exposed as agents of the United States in restoring the traditional Anglo-American condominium over the wealth that lies under the ground in the Arab world, that won't be so good for them. So they need something.

Thirdly, continuing with urgency of the peace process, so-called, there is, in fact, a window of opportunity. That's not a joke. It is, in fact, correct. Bush is largely correct in saying that "what we say goes." And, in fact, that means that what you see in the Gulf is what we say because that's what we want. We hold all the cards. And now that "what we say goes," we can ram through traditional U.S. policy -- which takes us to the second point. What are traditional U.S. policies? And: Is there a break with them? Of course, the way in which we're going to get credit for this, and the "Arab facade" is going to get some credibility is by dealing with the festering Palestinian problem. The simple answer to what U.S. traditional policy is is very straightforward. It has been adamant and inflexible opposition to



the peace process. Now, before I continue, I have to make a side comment on political discourse. Every political discourse has two meanings. It has a dictionary-meaning. And it has what we might call the PC-meaning -- the "politically correct" meaning. That is, the meaning that's used to advance power ends. They're always different. So, for example, "terrorism" in the the dictionary-meaning is what the Army manual says: "the use or threat of force to advance political ends." But in the PC-meaning of the word, "international terrorism" is: "the threat or use of force to implement political ends," when it's carried out by others, not when it's carried out by the United States or [its] client states. Then it has another name. It's called "retaliation" or "defense of freedom" or something like that. The same is true of the term, "democracy". There's a dictionary-meaning in which a state is democratic to the extent that the population has some meaningful way of participating in managing their own affairs. But then there's the PC-meaning, in which "democracy" means "the rule by elements who appreciate the transcendent need of those who own American society and who, therefore, must govern it. I borrow one of the favorite maxims of the founding fathers. That's the principle on which the country was founded. And only those who understand that are capable of participating in "democracy" in the PC-sense.

Well, the same is true with the term "peace process." There's the dictionary-meaning in which the "peace process" means something like "efforts to advance peace." And then there's the PC-meaning in which the "peace process" refers to whatever the U.S. happens to be doing at the moment. If what the U.S. happens to be doing at the moment is undermining the peace process and barring the peace process at every turn -- that's the "peace process."

Actually, it's all quite simple once you understand the rules. The reason for institutions like universities is to teach you the rules. So don't forget to do your homework. But once you figure all this stuff out, you can play the game rather well.

Well, breaking the rules and keeping to English instead of PC-language, the traditional U.S. policy has been, as I said, rigid opposition to the peace process -- rigid, inflexible, invariant opposition to the peace process, which is why it never gets anywhere. You can see this very clearly if you just look at the more or less irrelevant, factual record. The record is irrelevant because it's not "politically correct". It teaches the wrong lessons. But let's look at it anyway. For example, you could start with the U.N. General Assembly. The U.N. General Assembly meets every winter and they have a vote every year on advancing the peace process. I won't run through the whole record, but the last one was December, 1990 when the vote was 144 to 2 (United States and Israel), and that's the way it is all the way back. It's always something like that: N to 2, where N is everybody who wasn't asleep that day, and 2 is the United States and Israel. Sometimes it varies a little. In 1989, it was 151 to 3. For completely unexplained reasons, Dominica joined with the United States and Israel. Maybe somebody has some insight into that. But it effect, it's the United States and Israel blocking the peace process at the General Assembly.

Well, what about the Security Council? Notice, incidentally, that the United States is a very powerful country. That means that if there is a vote at the General Assembly which is, let's say, 160 to 1 -- and things like that happen pretty commonly -- if the one is the United States, it's vetoed. That's what it means to be in a position to be able to assert "what we say goes." What about the Security Council? Well, of course, that's out because there the United States can just flat veto everything, as, in fact, it's been doing since 1976. In 1976 -- first major U.S. veto -- there was a resolution which called for (I'll quote it): an Arab-Israeli peace settlement on the pre-1967 borders (that means the internationally recognized borders) with guarantees for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area, and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, including Israel and a new Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. That was introduced to the Security Council by Jordan, Syria and Egypt. It was backed by virtually the whole world. It was publicly backed by the P.L.O. According to Israel -- the current President of Israel, Chaim Herzog, who was then the U.N. Ambassador -- it was not only backed by the P.L.O., but actually prepared by the P.L.O. Another example of their terrorist past. It was vetoed by the United States. It is, therefore, out of history. Try to find it in the records of the peace process, or in documentary collections, and so on. In short, it's



just not "politically correct." The same thing happened in 1980. But in effect, the Security Council is ruled out as an agency for advancing the peace process. There have been a series of other proposals, rejected by the United States, and Israel was opposed to them. I won't run through the record.

Now, the U.S. is a very powerful country, so we can block a proposal by saying "no", period. Israel is less powerful, and, therefore, they have to be a little more vigorous in their opposition. So, in the case of the 1976 Security Council resolution, while the U.S. just vetoed it, Israel reacted differently. They reacted by bombing Lebanon, killing about fifty people in a raid that was described quite openly and, in fact, even reported as not being a reaction to anything -- which was not exactly correct. It was actually a retaliation against the United Nations for considering this resolution.

Then in 1980, when Saudi Arabia announced the so-called Fahd Plan, which again was sort of along the same lines (most of those plans are along the same lines), Israel reacted, according to the Israeli press, by sending Phantoms, which probably means nuclear-armed Phantoms over the oilfields. And the Hebrew press pointed out that foreign intelligence agencies are digging into their files to look up their records on the capacity of Israel to destroy the oilfields, meaning: If you push too far, there are things we can do!

Well, that's the way a weaker country has to respond. The U.S. is simpler. We just say "no", and that means it's off the agenda and it's out of history, if you have well-disciplined commissar class, at least. Well, this problem continued through the 1980s. Yassir Arafat, for example, kept annoying everybody by calling for negotiations with Israel, leading to mutual recognition. This required considerable acrobatics in the doctrinal institutions. So, for example, let's take a typical case: the current chief diplomatic correspondent of the New York Times, Thomas Friedman, who was the Jerusalem correspondent then, ... he added new things like, say, if headlines in the Israeli Press said: ARAFAT OFFERS NEGOTIATIONS. PERES (who is supposed to be the dove) SAYS "NO" -- there had to be an article by Thomas Friedman a couple days later saying: "The Israeli peace movement has never been more distraught. There are no Palestinians to talk to." There was an interview with Shimon Peres saying: "If only there were some Palestinians as beautiful as we are, we could settle all of this. But unfortunately, they're all terrorists who won't talk to us." And that routine went on year after year. The New York Times not only refused to publish the facts, but even refused to publish the letters referring to the facts, and occasionally even went as far as writing to correspondents explaining that they were not going to allow letters on it (actually, some of those are around).

It was all done quite brilliantly. The result was to craft a version of history which has no relation whatsoever to the facts. Actually, it has a relation to the facts for the logicians in the audience: the relation of contradiction. Apart from that, it has no relation to the facts, but it does have striking utility for power. And that was achieved in a manner which would have been pretty much admired by any totalitarian state. Now, there are reasons for this. There are reasons why the United States has been constantly opposed to the peace process. It has two features which the United States will not accept. One is: it calls for an INTERNATIONAL conference. And remember, the Monroe Doctrine has been extended to the Middle East long ago. It's too important to allow anybody to interfere. It's U.S. turf. Nobody is allowed in, so no international conference! Two: All international efforts to advance the peace process have at least a rhetorical commitment, whether anybody believes it or not, but they have some rhetoric about self-determination for the Palestinians. And that's unacceptable to the United States, not because the U.S. has anything in particular against the Palestinians, (basically, they don't exist) but because that would entail Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, and it's been U.S. policy that they should essentially maintain continued control over those territories. Therefore, for those two reasons, the U.S. has always blocked the peace process.

Now, turning to Madrid, you'll notice that it overcomes these two defects. It's completely unilateral. Nobody else is allowed in. Actually, to be more precise, Gorbachev was invited in, but that's because he is the completely powerless leader of a non-existent state, and therefore, he could provide a certain propaganda cover that people could talk about in the



international conference. But anyone who had even met the minimal condition of existence would not be allowed in.

Secondly, you'll notice again that there was nothing for the Palestinians. In fact, that's built into the very structure of the conference. They are part of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, which is the traditional U.S. policy that there is no independent Palestinian nationalism, hence, no issue for them to talk about. And the outcome of both that meeting and any aftermath will be determined by U.S. policy. So, going back to that: What is U.S. policy? Well, here you can find out, actually. There the U.S. Government has been kind enough to inform us. There's the public record. You can't find it in the media, as far as I'm aware, but it's there. You can pull out the documents. Some of it is even in the media occasionally. The U.S. position was made very clear in the fall of 1989 by James Baker with what was then called "the Baker Plan". The Baker Plan then had to do with negotiations between Jordan, Israel and Egypt, with some Palestinians whom we like allowed in. Baker presented five points, and the five points were that .... you can read them in the State Department bulletin, but one point was directed at the Palestinians. It said that any Palestinians who are permitted in by their overseers, the United States and Israel, will be permitted to discuss one topic; namely, implementation of the so-called Shamir Plan. In public statements, at the same time, Baker made it clear and explicit that, as he put it, the only plan under consideration is the Shamir Plan. There is no other initiative on the table. So if we want to find out what U.S. policy is, we turn to the Shamir Plan which is, in fact, the Shamir-Peres Plan -- the coalition plan of the Labor-Likud Government (two major parties in Israel) -- which had been put forth in May and was now endorsed.

The Shamir-Peres Plan (actually, the Shamir-Peres-Baker Plan) has three basic principles. Principle One says (I'm quoting it) there can be no additional Palestinian state, meaning there already is a Palestinian state: Jordan; and if Palestinians, Jordanians and the rest of the world don't agree, that just shows they're anti-Semites or ignorant Arabs, or something like that. So there's no issue of Palestinian self-determination. There already is a Palestinian state. That's Jordan; and there cannot be an additional one. There can be no change in the status of the Occupied Territories (they don't call it "Occupied" Territories, but "territories", meaning the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) except in accordance with the basic guidelines of the Government of Israel which bar any form of Palestinian self-determination. Point Number Three says, "no PLO", meaning that Palestinians can't pick their own representatives, even to sign a capitulation. Point Four says there will be what are called "free elections" run under Israeli military control (and if you've ever looked at a television set, you know what that means), with most of the Palestinian national leadership rotting away in prison camps without charges. Those are "free elections." So that's it. That's the Shamir-Peres-Baker Plan.

Nothing much has changed. Sometimes it's called autonomy. That's the current term for it. In the Israeli Press, more honest than here, one of the leading and most respected Israeli journalists, Danny Rubinstein (right in the mainstream, and no particular dove) just a couple of weeks ago described autonomy as the kind of autonomy that exists in a prisoner-of-war camp (I'm quoting it) where the prisoners are autonomous to cook their own meals and run cultural events. Furthermore, he went on to say that the autonomy is exactly what the Palestinians have now; namely, the right to run their own services. And there's a reason for that, he explained. He's pointed out that even the most extreme expansionists ("greater Israel" enthusiasts) don't call for literal annexation of the Territories because that would have a problem associated with it. It would mean that you would have to extend to the Territories Israeli law, including the minimal services that are provided for the second-class citizens of Israel itself, the Arab citizens. Obviously, that would bankrupt the treasury and, he estimates, would probably double the income in the Territories. So it's much more efficient to have heavy taxation, but to provide nothing in return under autonomy; namely, the autonomy of a prison camp. Well, that's what's being offered now, exactly as it was offered at Camp David. That's why it's so praised in the United States.

Well, there's a history to this. Somebody stop me if I go on too long. But I'll give a little bit of history. It's worth looking at. U.S. policy has undergone some changes. From 1967 to 1971, U.S. policy was right in the mainstream. It called for what was then the international



consensus, which meant a political settlement on the pre-1967 borders, with the wording that I just read. That was actually drawn from the resolutions at the time, reiterated in 1976: territorial guarantees, and security, and the right to live in peace, and so on and so forth. At that time, there was nothing for the Palestinians. They weren't part of it. It was just a settlement on those borders. Official U.S. policy said that there might be minor territorial adjustments which would, furthermore, be mutual. "Minor" and "mutual" territorial adjustments, just to fix things up, but that was the position.

In February, 1971 a problem arose. President Sadat of Egypt offered a peace treaty in those terms -- virtually identical with the terms of official U.S. policy. Israel rejected it (that was under the "doves", incidentally, the Labor Party), looking for broader territorial gains. And the United States had had to decide whether to pursue its own policy or to change that policy. That was kind of an internal bureaucratic conflict. Henry Kissinger then won out (he was then National Security Advisor) and pursued his policy which was what he called "stalemate" -- keeping things the way they are; no peace treaty. Israel responded to Sadat's offer by recognizing it as a genuine peace treaty. The U.S. backed the rejection. That's a big split in change in U.S. policy, actually. Coincidentally, that happens to be the month in which George Bush appeared on the national scene as U.N. Ambassador, although he had nothing to do with policy (probably no more than he does now). Ever since then, the U.S. policy has been flatly rejectionist, and separated from the rest of the world in the manner that I described.

From '71 to '73, that was a period of great triumphalism, both in Israel. The assumption was that Israel had overwhelming military power. It could disregard the Arabs altogether. As the former Chief of Military Intelligence in Israel, Yehoshafat Harkabi (now a dove, incidentally) .... as he put it at the time, "War is not the Arabs' game." They don't know which end of the gun to hold, so we can just keep the stalemate. Kissinger accepted that, so there was no need to respond to Sadat's offers, or anything. Now, in October, 1973, those illusions were shattered. It turns out that they did know which end of the guns to hold. It was kind of a near thing. Policy had to shift. Kissinger, who was, incidentally, no great genius, does understand things like violence. He seemed to have a good understanding of that. And he could see that Egypt had it, and therefore, he had to pay attention to them. And therefore, U.S. policy shifted. It shifted in the perfectly natural way. Since Egypt could not be simply dismissed as a basket case, the thing to do was to incorporate it into the U.S. system; that is, to accept Sadat's actually longstanding offers to turn Egypt into a U.S. client state, and to remove it from the conflict. That's the major Arab military force, and if you remove it from the conflict you essentially eliminate the only Arab deterrent, which means that Israel is then free to continue to pursue the major policies which the U.S. supports and pays for; namely, integrating the Occupied Territories and attacking its northern neighbor, Lebanon.

Well, that is the Camp David Agreement. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy was culminated in the Camp David Agreement which had exactly these properties. And that was quite obvious, at the time, to anyone who was willing to look at the facts without ideological blinkers. And it's actually conceded in retrospect. It's called "ironic". "Ironic" is another one of those technical terms which refers to the predictable consequences of intended U.S. actions which happen to conflict too radically with the professed values. So that's what's called "ironic" in the political science literature, and so on. And that's a term that applies very broadly to almost everything. So that was "ironic", but as I say, it was obvious to any ten-year-old at the time. And it's now conceded. Well, that's exactly what Israel did, of course, with HUGE U.S. aid. The Carter Administration raised aid to the stratosphere so that Israel could, in fact, continue to do this with the Arab deterrent removed.

Well, then comes the invasion of Lebanon. Actually, there was one in '78; another in 1982. It's purpose was to destroy the moderates in the P.L.O. That's widely conceded ... not even conceded -- proclaimed in the Israeli literature. General Harkabi pointed out that this was a war for the West Bank. The problem was P.L.O. moderation. They kept making these annoying demands for negotiations leading to mutual recognition, and so on. And that's no good. We want them to go back to terrorism. We want them shooting down planes, and that kind of stuff. Then, they're easy to deal with. The point was actually put rather well by the



editor of The New Republic, Martin Peretz in an interview in Israel right before the 1982 invasion. He advised Israel (I'm quoting) "to administer to the P.L.O. in Lebanon a lasting military defeat that will clarify to the Palestinians in the West Bank that their struggle for an independent state has suffered a setback of many years. Then, the Palestinians will be turned into just another crushed nation like the Kurds and the Afghans. And their problems, which are beginning to be boring, will be forgotten."

Well, it's possible, with regard to the Afghans, that if you go to some of the more extreme Stalinist elements in the Communist Party bureaucracy, you could hear similar comments on the Afghans back in those days. And I should say that Peretz comments and attitudes toward the Kurds do rather accurately capture U.S. policy toward them, as we've just seen again. Well that's U.S. policy, and it stays like that until today.

Now, there's a spectrum, as always. There are the hawks and the doves. So let's look. According to the hawks, the Palestinians deserve nothing like other crushed nations. And then there are the doves. And here, a good example is Thomas Friedman again. On the occasion of his receipt of the Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on Israel ... he had several interviews in the Israeli Press where he advised Israel to run the Occupied Territories in the manner in which they run South Lebanon. Now, that means under the control of a terrorist, mercenary army with big prison camps where you hold hundreds of torture chambers; actually, where you hold hundreds of hostages to ensure that the villages submit to the rule of the terrorist mercenary force. And you bomb beyond their borders when you feel like it. And so, this is the proper way to run the Occupied Territories. However, remember that this is a "dove" speaking, so his position is: You should give the Palestinians something. And what he actually said is: "If you give Ahmed a seat in the bus, he may limit his demands." So you ought to give Ahmed a seat in the bus. Well, you could imagine that maybe there's some neo-Nazi somewhere who is advising the Syrians that they should run what is now Israel the way they run the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. But they should give "Hymie" a seat in the bus. Then maybe he'll limit his demands. That would be the "doves". Or maybe somebody is advising South Africa that you should give "Sambo" a seat in the bus, and maybe he'll shut up. That's the "doves". So again, there's the spectrum, and we learn a little more about ourselves by looking at it. Well, the "doves" view is that the Palestinians should be given a seat in the bus; namely, autonomy -- the autonomy of a prison camp; basically, what they have now, but nothing more. No citizenship. No independence.

The great achievement of the Madrid Conference, and the one that has called forth such raptures in the American press, is that the Palestinian representatives permitted in by the United States have partially agreed to this. So the news -- actually, the Israeli Lobby -- is naturally quite enthusiastic. The New York Times the other day had an op-ed by the Deputy Director of something called the Washington Institute for Near East Policy which is an organization that journalists go to when they don't want to express their own opinions, but they want their support for Israeli policies expressed for them by an objective outsider. That's a standard journalistic trick. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has no other function, as far as I'm aware, than to provide such statements. Its deputy director notes (I'm quoting) that "Gains were made in Madrid. The Palestinians reversed their thirteen-year rejection of autonomy which was called for in the Camp David Accords" -- the accords welcomed by Menachem Begin because they removed the Arab deterrent from the conflict and offered the Palestinians the autonomy of a prisoner-of-war camp, as the mainstream Israeli press points out. Well, the news columns in the U.S. are much impressed by what they call (quoting the New York Times) "the Palestinian self-adjustment to the real world." That is, the acceptance of a period of autonomy under Israeli domination, during which Israel can establish the fact of permanent domination with enormous subsidies from U.S. taxpayers. The idea is that now that Ahmed has limited his demands, he's praised for what is called "the new pragmatism", this willingness to accept half a loaf under Israeli domination instead of the all-or-nothing demands -- that's referring to the demands for self-determination in a Palestinian state alongside Israel (a totally absurd idea, supported only by the entire world outside of the United States and its Israeli client), and therefore, by definition, extremist, rejectionist, and not pragmatic. Pragmatic means: self-adjustment to the real world which is: What we say goes. If you do that, then the news



columnists are willing to welcome you as "pragmatic". That's Clyde Haberman, and the same is true of a host of others. I won't bother referring to it. In fact, there's so much of it, and it's too late to talk about it, but it's standard. Open the press at random and you'll find similar praise for "the new pragmatism."

Until 1988, to continue with the history a little bit, the U.S. was quite satisfied with the status quo, as was Israel. In 1988, the Intifada was beginning to raise some costs -- costs for Israel to control it, costs for the U.S. which, in fact, was becoming something of a laughing stock internationally because of the increasingly desperate insistence that the Palestinians were not repeating the magic words produced by George Schultz for them to say. It became a joke, in fact. So the U.S. made the obvious decision to pretend that the Palestinians had capitulated, and to impose upon them the U.S. positions. They'd say, "Okay, they accepted our position." There's actually a name for that in the diplomatic literature. It's called "the trollop ploy", referring to Trollop Novel. This was done by the Kennedy Administration whom you'll remember were big intellectuals. They referred to things like novels, and the references to the Trollop Novel where the heroine interprets a meaningless gesture by the hero as an offer of marriage. So the trick is, if you're really stuck in a diplomatic corner, what you do, if you have enormous power and control over the world information system, is pretend that the other guy has accepted your demands and then stick him with it. And count on the media and the academic scholarship and so on to say, "Yeah, they capitulated to your demands." In mid-December of 1988, George Schultz went through this comic act, claimed that Yassir Arafat had said the magic words. In fact, as any literate person could see, he was saying exactly what he had been saying for years. It was just as far from the U.S. demands as ever. And no Palestinian spokesperson could ever accept the actual U.S. demands. But now, they were stuck with it because George Schultz had said so, and everybody repeated it. So that ended that story.

The U.S. then moved to what was called a "dialogue" with the Palestinians. They were offered an opportunity to have tea in the master's ante chamber where they were told in the first meeting (transcripts were leaked and published in Israel and Egypt -- not here, though they were in English in the Jerusalem Post, so everybody could read them) that they should understand two things. One: There would be no international conference, so forget about that; and Two: they should call off the Intifada, or what the U.S. described as "the riots which we regard as terrorism against the state of Israel." So, in other words, go back to the previous status quo and forget about any political settlement, and then we'll agree to talk to you. Well, this was understood very well within Israel, I should say. The Defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin of the dovish Labor Party had a meeting with Peace Now leaders shortly after the opening of the dialogue. And he told them: "Don't worry about it. It's quite okay. We're in favor of it." He said that the dialogue is a low-level dialogue which is completely meaningless, and which will provide us, he said, with a year or more to crush the Intifada by force. And he assured them that they will be crushed. Well, that's what happened. They were crushed. There's a limit to what flesh and blood can endure. Violence works. The dialogue diverted attention as intended. Then came along the diplomatic initiative to divert the Bush/ Baker/Peres/Shamir Plan, the purpose of which was to divert any attempt to implement the real peace process.

That brings us right up until today. As far as I can see, that's what's happening in Madrid.

This last comment. There is some thinking behind this. There is a strategic conception behind it. It's one which is more or less permanent. It's part of the old world order, the "new world order" and all the next ten years' world order, and so on. The strategic conception about the Middle East is pretty simple. The major issue is the energy reserves. The U.S. has to control them. Nobody else is allowed to interfere in U.S. turf. Too important. There's a method for controlling them. The method is, first of all, to construct an "Arab facade", family dictatorships which sort of manage it for us. They're very weak, so you don't have to worry about them having any funny ideas. The "Arab facade" has to be protected from the population of the region. That requires regional enforcers (that's the second part), preferably non-Arab. They have an easier time killing Arabs. So that's Turkey Iran, Israel, Pakistan, to provide sort of a Praetorian guard for the Saudi elite, and so on. That's what Ben-Gurion



used to call a "periphery pact". So there's this regional enforcer system. And then in the background there are the guys with the real muscle -- the U.S. and Britain, in case things get out of control. That's the system and that doesn't change very much.

Now, anyone who contributes to this system has some rights. The "Arab facade" obviously contributes. They manage the oil wells for us. The regional enforcers contribute. They have rights. We obviously have rights. In fact, ultimately the only ones who do. And so does our British lieutenant, so long as they remain a lieutenant. What about the Palestinians? Well, they don't contribute to this system. They don't have wealth. They don't have power. In fact, they're a damn nuisance. They stir up Arab nationalism. You know, that is these pressures for these democratic openings that are always a problem. So they have a negative value, in fact. And since they contribute nothing to our domination of the region, it follows by quite simple logic that they have no human rights whatsoever. That's an elementary principle of statecraft. Human rights depend on your contribution to the needs of power and profit. Other than that, it's irrelevant.

Well, they don't have any rights. In fact, they have negative rights. They're even a nuisance. And from that, you can pretty well predict U.S. policy. And, in fact, it works pretty well. Remember, this stuff is not quantum physics. You don't have to be a big thinker to understand it. Big efforts are made in the academic disciplines and elsewhere to make it look difficult. But, in fact, it's all pretty straightforward and, at least to my knowledge, there's almost nothing in international affairs or, again, in this stuff that a literate teen-ager couldn't figure out within a few minutes. And that's pretty much the way it works. If you understand it, you can see what's going on, and you can usually pretty well predict what's going to happen. You have to remember to translate "politically correct" discourse back into English so you can get out of those problems, but that's not too hard, either.

With regard to the Palestinians, the position really has not changed, as far as I'm aware, since about 1948. Back in 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already recognized Israel. They were impressed by Israel's military victories, and they recognized it as the second most powerful regional military force and a possible potential base for U.S. power. That relationship then got established in later years, but there's no time to discuss it. There was also a discussion of the Palestinians. The Israeli foreign records show it. The U.S. didn't talk about it much, and didn't care about them. But the Foreign Ministry in Israel -- Moshe Sharrett's Foreign Ministry (this is, incidentally, the doves) pointed out in their internal records that the Palestinians ... they said: "They will be crushed. They will be dispersed like human waste, and will join the most impoverished masses in the Arab world." So there's no worry about them. As Mark Peretz put it, "They're just another crushed nation, like the Kurds and therefore, we don't have to pay much attention to them. That's been the policy ever since. And, as I just mentioned, that was Yitzhak Rabin's statement to the Peace Now leaders in February, 1989. He assured them that they will be broken.

Well, will they be broken? Actually, the answer doesn't lie in the Middle East. It lies in the hands of those who are funding the operation. There is certainly no hope -- no faith in the President's noble intentions, or other illusions. Rather, it's necessary to do some other things. The first one is to clear away the mountains of rubble that conceal the events of history -- not only in this case, but in every other one -- to view what's happening without any illusions, and to create public pressures that can put an end to the extreme rejectionist policies that the United States has been pursuing virtually alone in the world. If we're honest, we'll also be able to see that this is true in Central America and, indeed, throughout the subject domains generally of what is euphemistically called "the South".

The President is right, to a degree, when he says "What we say goes." What remains to be determined is what we choose to be.

Thanks.

-- E N D --